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1.       Introduction 
The global financial crisis has led to a re-examination of corporate governance 
practices at banks, with some policy makers questioning the extent to which managerial 
entrenchment and the failure of the boards to monitor executives may have led to 
excessive risk-taking and to financial instability. From a theoretical perspective, however, 
it is not at all clear that the implementation of good governance practices, such as having 
an independent board, should lead to less risk-taking. Corporate governance that aligns 
managerial incentives with shareholder interests can potentially result in more risk-taking 
as shareholders face pay-offs that are restricted on the downside by limited liability.1  
Moreover, banks, especially those that are systemically important, tend to be 
supported by the financial safety net when they are in distress. Specifically, banks can 
benefit from explicit state guarantees in the form of risk-insensitive deposit insurance as 
well as potential implicit guarantees in the form of liquidity and capital support that 
prevent their failures. Banks’ contingent access to the financial safety net represents a put 
option provided by public authorities. The value of this put option increases in the 
riskiness of bank activities and in bank leverage.2 Furthermore, banks have incentives to 
herd and take on correlated (or systemic) risks if the state guarantees are more likely to be 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986). John and Senbet 
(1998) argue that good governance that reduces agency costs of equity can increase risk-shifting agency 
costs with respect to debtholders and taxpayers. Empirically, John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) find that 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance in the form of stronger investor protection brings about 
increased risk-taking and higher growth for an international sample of non-financial firms. Acharya, 
Amihud, and Litov (2011) show evidence that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy affect corporate 
investment choice by reducing corporate risk-taking. Kroszner and Strahan (2001) also provide supporting 
evidence of a shareholder–creditor conflict by showing that US non-financial firms tend to have bankers on 
their boards only when the conflict is less likely to be important. 
2 Merton (1977) shows that deposit insurance with a risk-insensitive insurance premium provides 
shareholders with a subsidy that increases in value with higher leverage and higher asset risk. 
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triggered in the event of multiple bank failures.3 Bank shareholders can thus benefit from 
taking on more stand-alone as well as systemic risk, and the benefits of additional risk-
taking increase with the strength of financial safety nets as shareholders try to shift risk to 
taxpayers.   
 Shareholder incentives to take on greater risks can be opposed by managers who 
tend to be more risk-averse compared to shareholders. Unlike shareholders who are likely 
to hold diversified stock portfolios, managers can have their jobs, reputations as well as a 
substantial portion of their personal wealth tied to the performance and health of their 
firm (Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993). A bank’s corporate governance is a key determinant 
of how this potential conflict between bank shareholders and managers to take on risk is 
resolved.  
 In this paper, we empirically examine the relations between banks’ corporate 
governance and risks for a sample of US banks over the period 1990-2014, and for an 
international sample of banks over the period 2004-2008.  Our main goal is to examine 
how the relation between corporate governance and bank risk is affected by the fact that 
banks tend to be covered by a financial safety net (see Laeven, 2013, for a discussion).  In 
particular, we examine whether shareholder-friendly corporate governance results in 
greater risk-taking for banks compared to non-financial firms, since typically only 
financial firms benefit from financial safety nets provided by the state. We also examine 
whether shareholder-friendly corporate governance leads to greater risk-taking at larger 
                                                          
3 Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) show that regulators may find it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all 
failed banks if the number of failed banks is large. This provides banks with incentives to herd and 
increases the likelihood of systemic crises. Using options on individual banks and on a financial sector 
index, Kelly, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) show evidence of a collective guarantee for the 
financial sector. 
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banks compared to their smaller counterparts, as larger banks generally benefit from 
greater protection by the financial safety net on account of their too-big-to-fail status (see 
Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton, 2016; Bertay, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2013). 
Finally, we consider whether shareholder-friendly corporate governance increases bank 
risks more in countries with more generous financial safety nets. 
 By examining a range of bank risk variables, corporate governance proxies and 
samples of US and international banks as well as non-financial firms, our analysis is able 
to provide a comprehensive picture of how the relation between corporate governance 
and bank risk is affected by the existence of the financial safety net. We examine three 
variables reflecting a bank’s stand-alone risks (distance to default, leverage ratio, and 
asset volatility), and also three variables that capture a bank’s contribution to financial-
sector systemic risk. The systemic risk variables we consider are the marginal expected 
shortfall (MES), and systemic risk (SRISK) variables proposed by Acharya, Engle and 
Richardson (2012), and the COVAR variable proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2016). Following Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), we use an overall index 
of shareholder-friendly corporate governance dealing with board composition, 
compensation, auditing and take-over related issues. In addition, following Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2008), we use an index of management entrenchment. Finally, we 
consider a variable that captures a board’s independence vis-à-vis management. 
 Using US data, we find that there is a stronger relationship between shareholder-
friendly corporate governance and stand-alone and systemic risks for banks compared to 
non-financial firms.  This finding is consistent with banks being the main beneficiaries of 
a financial safety net compared to non-financial firms. We also find that the relation 
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between risk and shareholder-friendly corporate governance is stronger for larger banks, 
consistent with larger banks benefiting from a too-big-to-fail guarantee.  Finally, we 
compare large banks to large non-financial firms through triple differencing.  We show 
that the too-big-to-fail relation that we find between governance and risk-taking in the 
banking sector is not present in the non-financial sector.  
 The differences in the governance and risk-taking relation that we observe 
between large and small banks, as well as between banks and non-financial firms, could 
be driven by unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables. Corporate governance can 
also, to some extent, be endogenously determined. For instance, a strong preference for 
risk on the part of a bank’s shareholders could jointly give rise to both considerable bank 
risk-taking and shareholder-friendly corporate governance. We include bank fixed effects 
in all regressions in the paper, thereby controlling for any time-invariant unobservable 
bank characteristics that can affect both bank corporate governance and bank risks. To 
further address potential endogeneity concerns, we examine changes in risk-taking 
around an exogenous regulatory change that required increased board independence at 
some, but not all banks. 
 Specifically, in 2003 the NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges announced new 
regulations requiring at least 50% of board members at listed firms to be independent and 
not affiliated with the firm. Firms were required to comply with the new rules starting in 
2004. We use the fact that some firms already had a majority of independent directors on 
their boards, and thus complied with the new rules when they were announced, while 
other firms had to increase the number of independent directors by the time the rules 
came into effect.  
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We find that banks that were affected by the reforms increased their stand-alone 
and systemic risk more (compared to banks that were already compliant) if they were 
larger.  This result is consistent with our other findings and the notion that larger banks 
benefit more from financial safety net protection compared to smaller banks.   
Furthermore, we find that the tendency of larger affected banks to increase their risk was 
stronger compared to larger non-financial firms.  This finding is again consistent with 
mainly banks benefiting from the financial safety net. These results strongly suggest a 
causal link between shareholder-friendly corporate governance and greater risk-taking for 
larger banks as well as larger banks compared to larger non-financial firms. 
Our estimates of the differential effects of shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance on the riskiness of banks compared to non-banks, and of large banks 
compared to small banks, are economically significant. Relative to non-banks, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the governance variable reduces the distance-to-default 
measure of banks by 0.35 (or 0.14 standard deviation), it reduces banks’ MES by 41 basis 
points (or 0.21 standard deviation), and it increases banks’ SRISK by 0.89 billion US 
dollars (or 0.1 standard deviation). With respect to bank size, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the governance measure reduces distance-to-default by 0.36 and MES by 68 
basis points for banks that have assets of $5 billion, while the corresponding decreases in 
distance-to-default and MES for banks with assets of $50 billion are substantially larger 
at 0.79 and 152 basis points respectively.  
Going beyond the US setting, we use an international sample of banks to examine 
the impact of the strength of national financial safety nets. We find that shareholder-
friendly corporate governance varies more positively with bank stand-alone and systemic 
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risks in countries with more generous financial safety nets. Specifically, our estimation 
implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in the corporate governance variable 
augments risk as measured by the distance to default, asset volatility, and MES variables 
by 2.3%, 1.7%, and 4.7% more in the country where the index of financial safety net 
strength is one standard deviation higher.4 These findings are confirmed when we use an 
instrumental-variable estimation in which a bank’s corporate governance is instrumented 
by the annual country-mean value of the corporate governance variable for all non-
financial firms. The results based on international data provide additional evidence that 
the relations between a bank’s corporate governance and risks reflect its incentives to 
exploit the financial safety net. 
 Our study fits in an emerging literature that has examined the impact of corporate 
governance on bank risk-taking.5 Pathan (2009) finds that small boards and boards that 
are not controlled by the CEO lead to higher risk for a sample of US bank holding 
companies over the 1997-2004 period. Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006) find a positive 
relation between option-based executive compensation and market measures of risk for a 
sample of US commercial banks.  DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2013) find that CEO risk-
taking incentives lead to riskier business policy decisions with respect to loans to 
businesses, non-interest based banking activities, and investment in mortgage-backed 
securities at US commercial banks. Calomiris and Carlson (2016) examine bank 
                                                          
4 We do not find similarly significant differential effects for the SRISK and COVAR variables. 
5 Recent surveys are offered by Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2011) and Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro 
(2012). Stulz (2016) discusses how corporate governance and risk management should be designed to 
ensure that banks only take good risks that add value. 
8 
 
ownership and risk-taking at US banks in the 1890s, and find that higher managerial 
ownership is associated with lower bank default risk.6  
Several papers have examined how banks with different corporate governance 
regimes fared during the crisis. Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2016) find that high 
share ownership by lower-level management leads to a substantially higher probability of 
default for US commercial banks over the 2007-2010 period. Beltratti and Stulz (2012), 
and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards 
and CEO compensation contracts that better align the interests of management and 
shareholders experienced worse stock market performance during the financial crisis. 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) show that US bank holding companies that had a strong and 
independent risk management function in place before the onset of the financial crisis 
fared better in terms of operating and stock performance during the crisis.  
Multi-country studies of bank corporate governance and risk-taking are relatively 
scarce.  Laeven and Levine (2009) examine the relation between bank ownership and 
bank risk-taking for an international sample of banks. They find that stronger cash flow 
rights of large owners are associated with higher bank risks, consistent with the 
hypothesis that bank shareholders favor greater risk-taking as compared to managers and 
creditors. These authors also consider the interaction between bank regulation and 
ownership, finding that deposit insurance is associated with an increase in risk only when 
the bank has a large equity holder. For a sample of international banks, Anginer, 
                                                          
6 A few papers examine theoretically how executive compensation can be designed to reduce risk-shifting 
in banks. For example, John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) suggest that fairly priced deposit insurance 
premium can induce shareholders to commit to writing executive compensation contracts that reduce risk-
shifting. Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2015) show that basing executive compensation on CDS spread can 
mitigate risk-shifting. 
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Demirguc-Kunt, Huizinga, and Ma (2016) find that shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance varies negatively with bank capitalization rates. Using international data, 
Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) find that financial institutions with more independent 
boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the 
global financial crisis.  
Our contribution to this literature is three-fold. First, this paper is the first to study 
the relation between a bank’s corporate governance and its contribution to stand-alone as 
well as systemic risk. Second, we examine how the generosity and credibility of financial 
safety nets affect the relation between governance and bank risk. In particular, we 
compare banks to non-financial firms, compare larger banks to their smaller counterparts, 
and also consider cross-country differences in the strength of the safety net, adding to a 
literature that has mostly relied on US data. Third, we examine changes in risk-taking 
behavior around an exogenous regulatory change in governance and use non-financial 
firms in our analyses as a control group, which alleviates potential endogeneity concerns. 
Our findings on the interaction of bank-level corporate governance variables and 
the financial safety net have important implications for corporate governance reforms in 
the financial sector. In particular, our results suggest that one has to be cautious to call for 
‘better’ corporate governance at banks as long as generous financial safety nets and too-
big-to-fail guarantees are in place. In fact, governance reforms designed to better align 
the incentives of managers and shareholders could fail to be in the interests of taxpayers 
who ultimately bear the cost of maintaining the financial safety net.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the data and 
variable construction. We present the empirical results in Section 3. We start with an 
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analysis of the relations between corporate governance and stand-alone and systemic 
risks for US banks as well as non-financial firms. Then we consider the impact of the 
NYSE and NASDAQ reforms towards greater board independence on measures of bank 
risk. Finally, we consider the relation between corporate governance and bank risk using 
international data so that we can bring cross-country variation in the strength of financial 
safety nets into the analysis. Section 4 concludes with policy implications. 
 
2. Data and variable construction 
 In this study, we relate measures of firm stand-alone and systemic risks to indices 
of corporate governance for a sample of US banks and non-financial firms for the 1990-
2014 period, and also for an international sample of banks for the 2004-2008 period. We 
describe the US and international samples in turn. 
2.1.       The sample of US banks and non-financial firms  
We examine three measures of a bank’s stand-alone risk and three measures of a 
bank’s contribution to the financial sector’s systemic risk. Accounting and market data 
used to construct risk measures for US banks are from Compustat North America and 
CRSP.  Our first measure of bank stand-alone risk is Merton’s (1974) distance-to-default 
measure, denoted as DD. This variable measures the difference between the asset value 
of the firm and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s 
asset value (see Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi, 2008, p. 2914).  
In particular, the market value of a company’s equity, 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸, is modeled as a call 
option on the company’s assets, AV , by 1 2( ) ( ) (1 )
d T rT d T
E A AV V e N d Xe N d e V
− − −= − + − , 
with ( )21 log( ( / 2/ ) )A A AV r d T Td ssX +  −= +  and 2 1 Ad d Ts= − . Here ( )N ⋅  is the 
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cumulative normal probability function; X is the face value of debt maturing at time T ; r 
is the risk-free rate; d is the dividend rate expressed in terms of AV ; and As  is the 
volatility of the asset value that is related to equity volatility by 1( )
d T
E A A Es V e N d s V
−= .    
We simultaneously solve equations for EV  and Es  to find the values of AV  and 
As .  We use the market value of equity for EV and total liabilities to proxy for the face 
value of debt, X.  In calculating standard deviations, we require the company to have at 
least 90 non-missing returns over the previous 12 months. T equals one year, and we use 
the one-year T-bill rate for the risk-free rate, r. The dividend rate, d, is the sum of the 
prior year’s common and preferred dividends divided by the market value of assets. We 
use the Newton method to simultaneously solve for AV  and As .7 After we determine asset 
values AV , we follow Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) and take the mean asset 
return, denoted by m, to be equal to the average equity premium set at 6%.8 Merton’s 
(1974) distance to default, DD, is finally computed as: 
 ( ) ( )2log 2A A
A
V X m d s T
DD
s T
+ − −
=  
(1) 
A higher value of DD implies a greater distance to default, and hence lower risk.  
A bank’s distance to default reflects both its leverage and the riskiness of its 
assets. These two aspects of bank risk are captured by the Leverage and AVOL variables, 
respectively. The Leverage variable is computed as the sum of the market value of equity 
                                                          
7 For starting values of the unknown variables, we use A EV V X= + and ( )A E E Es s V V X= + . We also 
winsorize Es  and / ( )E EV V X+  at the 1st and 99th percentile levels to reduce the influence of outliers.   
8 We obtain similar distance to default values if we compute the asset return as , , 1max 1( / , )A t A t rV V − − , 
following Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004). 
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and the book value of liabilities divided by the market value of equity. The mean of the 
Leverage variable for US banks is 9.01 (see Panel A of Table 1 for summary statistics for 
the sample of US banks). The AVOL variable is constructed as the annualized standard 
deviation of the asset return computed from Merton’s (1974) option pricing model. 
Leverage and AVOL are both negatively associated with distance to default, and higher 
values of these variables indicate greater bank risk. In the regression analysis, we 
consider as dependent variables Leverage and AVOL multiplied by -1 so that higher 
values of the dependent variables imply lower risk to be consistent with the DD measure. 
We denote the resulting negative Leverage and AVOL variables as -Leverage 
and -AVOL, respectively. 
Shareholders of non-financial firms may be less interested in risk-taking 
compared to financial firms, as non-financial firms generally are not protected by a 
financial safety net. To test for a potentially different relation between corporate 
governance and risk at non-financial firms, we extend the sample to include non-financial 
US firms in some specifications. Panel B provides summary statistics for these non-
financial firms in the US. Comparing Panels A and B, we see that non-financial firms 
have a slightly lower average distance to default of 5.22 (compared to 5.33 for banks), 
which reflects lower average Leverage of 2.07 (compared to 9.01) and higher average 
AVOL of 0.30 (compared to 0.10). 
 Following the recent literature, we use three variables to measure a bank’s 
systemic risk. The first measure is the marginal expected shortfall (MES).  Following 
Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012), we compute the MES as the average bank equity 
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return on days when the market as a whole is in the lower tail of its return distribution 
provided by:  
 ( ), , ,|i t i t m tMES E R R C= <  (2) 
in which ,i tR  is firm i’s equity return on day t, ,m tR  is the aggregate market index return, 
and C is the 5th percentile value of the market index returns over the past 12 months. We 
compute MES on an annual basis using daily stock market information from CRSP for 
US firms, and daily stock returns from Compustat Global for non-US firms. For the 
aggregate market index, we use the corresponding FTSE stock index of the country 
where the firm is incorporated. A lower MES variable indicates that a firm experiences 
lower returns during market distress. Hence, a lower MES variable indicates higher 
systemic risk. 
Our second systemic risk measure, SRISK, represents a bank’s expected capital 
shortfall when the market return is in the lowest 5% bracket in a given year (Acharya, 
Engle, and Richardson, 2012). Compared to MES, SRISK incorporates information on a 
bank’s size and leverage. SRISK measures capital shortfall with respect to a prudential 
capital ratio and is computed as [ ]( ) |SRISK E k Debt Equity Equity Crisis= + − . In this 
expression, Debt is the book value of debt, Equity is the market value of equity, and k is 
the prudential capital ratio set to 8%. SRISK is related to the expected shortfall for each 
firm i in year t as follows:  
 , , , ,(1 ) (1 )i t i t i t i tDebt LRMES EquitSRISK yk k⋅ ⋅ − ⋅= + −   (3) 
in which LRMES is the long-run marginal expected shortfall computed as
, ,ex1 (18p )i t i tMESLRMES ×= − . Higher SRISK indicates greater risk. In the regression 
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analysis, we use as a dependent variable SRISK multiplied by -1 so that a higher 
dependent variable indicates lower risk to be consistent with the other risk measures. This 
negative value of SRISK is denoted by -SRISK.  
Although capital shortfall as reflected by SRISK would not have the same 
implications for non-financial firms that are not subject to prudential capital 
requirements, one can still think of SRISK for non-financial firms as a systemic risk 
measure that combines information of their MES, size, and leverage. In Panels A and B 
of Table 1, we see that banks and non-financial firms have average values of SRISK of -
0.42 and –3.22, respectively. Hence, banks as well as non-financial firms on average 
maintain a negative capital shortfall, i.e. a capital surplus, relative to the prudential 
capital ratio (of 8%) in case of a very low market return. There is, however, considerable 
time-series variation in SRISK for both banks and non-financial firms over our sample 
period. In 2008 during the financial crisis, for example, the average SRISK was 4.24 for 
banks and -0.87 for non-financial firms.   
As our third systemic risk measure, we compute the conditional value-at-risk, 
COVAR, following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). This risk measure is the value-at-
risk of the financial system conditional on a bank being in distress minus the value-at-risk 
of the financial system conditional on the bank being in a normal state. Following Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2016), we compute the COVAR measure for each firm using quantile 
regressions and a set of macro state variables. In particular, we run the following two 
quantile regressions.  
, 1 ,i t i i t i tR Mα γ −= + +                   (4)   
, | | , | 1 ,m t system i system i i t system i t i tR R Mα β γ −= + + +               (5)  
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in which ,i tR  is the equity return for firm i in week t, ,m tR  is the weekly return of country 
m’s stock index. 1tM −  are lagged state variables: the change in the 3-months T-bill rate, the 
change in the term spread, the weekly country stock index return, and the volatility of the 
daily country stock index return over the past four weeks. We use weekly stock market 
information from CRSP for US firms, and weekly stock returns from Compustat Global 
for non-US firms. For the aggregate market index, we use the FTSE stock index 
corresponding to the country where the firm is incorporated.  
The quantile regressions (4) and (5) are estimated at the end of each year using 
data from a rolling five-year window.9 The COVAR variable is computed as the change 
in the value-at-risk of the system when the institution’ return is at the 5th percentile (or 
when the institution is in distress) minus the value at risk of the system when the 
institution’ return is at the 50% percentile given by: 
 ( )5% 5% 5% 50%| , ,ˆ ˆ ˆt system i i t i tCO R RVAR β= −  (6) 
Since we use equity returns in the estimation, lower values of COVAR indicate a higher 
contribution to systemic risk.10   
There are similarities as well as differences between the three measures of 
systemic risk. MES measures what happens to a firm’s equity returns when the market is 
in distress, whereas COVAR complements MES by measuring what happens to the 
value-at-risk of the financial system when the firm is in distress. SRISK incorporates 
information on firm size and leverage, and hence addresses the too-big-to-fail dimension 
                                                          
9 We require each firm to have at least 52 weeks of non-missing returns over the past 5 years to be included 
in the estimation. 
10 Some papers including Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) use return losses (returns multiplied by -1) to 
compute conditional value-at-risk. With return losses, higher values indicate higher risk. 
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of systemic risk. Benoit, Colletaz, Hurlin, and Pérignon (2013) compare these three 
measures from a theoretical and empirical viewpoint, and show that these measures can 
be expressed as transformations of market risk measures such as Beta.  
While our main focus is on examining the relations between corporate governance 
and ex-ante measures of bank risk-taking, for robustness we also consider how realized 
risk proxied by equity returns during the crisis vary with corporate governance. In 
particular, we compute average monthly stock returns (Return) over the crisis period 
from January to September 2008.   
We use three alternative variables to represent the shareholder-friendliness of a 
firm’s corporate governance. First, following Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2009), the Governance variable is based on 44 individual governance attributes related 
to board size and composition, compensation and ownership, external auditing, and anti-
takeover measures, available from the Corporate Governance Quotient database 
assembled by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Each attribute is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the characteristic is qualified as shareholder-friendly, and zero 
otherwise. A listing of the individual attributes is provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
The Governance variable reflects the values of the 44 attributes, and we scale it to a range 
between zero and one by dividing the number of qualifying attributes by the total number 
of attributes. This Governance variable is available for banks located in 22 countries for 
the years 2003-2007. The country coverage is provided in Table A3 in the Appendix. The 
mean value of the Governance variable for US banks is 0.62. This reflects an increase in 
this variable from 0.59 in 2003 to 0.66 in 2007, as overall corporate governance became 
more shareholder-friendly at US banks during this period.  
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Our second measure of corporate governance is the entrenchment index of 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008). This index represents six governance provisions, 
such as poison pills and golden parachutes, indicating management entrenchment and 
power vis-à-vis shareholders. We use data on these provisions from ISS (formerly 
Riskmetrics) over the 1990-2014 time period. We take the negative value of this measure 
to make it increasing in shareholder power vis-à-vis management in accordance with the 
other governance measures we use in the paper. The mean of the Entrenchment variable 
is -2.35 for US banks. 
The third measure of governance is the Independence variable, which is the 
percentage of board members who are not affiliated with the firm. The board 
independence data are also from ISS (formerly Riskmetrics), and are available for the 
years 1995-2014. The mean corporate governance variables are very similar for the 
samples of banks and non-financial firms. The mean Independence variable, for instance, 
equals 0.70 for both banks and non-financial firms.   
We use three additional firm-level control variables that are relevant and common 
to banks and non-financial firms. First, Return on assets is a profitability measure 
constructed as net income divided by total assets with a mean of 0.02. More profitable 
banks with a higher return on assets may have lower insolvency risk. Second, Market-to-
book is the market value of total equity divided by the book value of total equity with a 
mean of 2.05. Banks with higher market-to-book ratios can be farther away from 
insolvency. Finally, Size is the log of total assets. Larger banks could pursue riskier 
strategies if they are deemed to be too big to fail, but they could also be less risky as a 
result of better diversification. The average Size variable is 8.27.  
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2.2.      The sample of non-US banks 
Banks can have higher incentives to take on risks if they operate in countries with 
stronger and more generous financial safety nets. To be able to take the strength of the 
financial safety net into account, we also examine an international sample of banks. Panel 
C of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the non-US banks in this sample.11 The 
Governance variable is the only corporate governance variable available for the non-US 
sample of banks. Comparing Panels A and C, we see that the average Governance 
variable for non-US banks of 0.56 was lower than the average for US banks of 0.62, 
which suggests that corporate governance was on average less shareholder-friendly at 
non-US banks during 2004-2008.  
Following Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), we construct the Financial 
safety net variable as a country-level measure of the strength of the financial safety net 
through a principal components analysis of deposit insurance design features. 
Specifically, we collect data on deposit insurance characteristics in the year 2003 from 
Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005), and construct Financial safety net as 
the sum of four principal components derived from eight deposit insurance 
characteristics: (1) existing coverage of foreign currency deposits, (2) existing coverage 
of interbank deposits, (3) an absence of coinsurance, (4) coverage per depositor per bank 
per account, (5) existence of funding ex ante, (6) existence of funding by the government, 
(7) existence of a risk-insensitive insurance premium, and (8) the ratio of insurance 
coverage and deposits per capita. In each case, a higher value for the deposit insurance 
                                                          
11 Non-US banks have a relatively large average SRISK of 0.80 compared to an average SRISK of -0.42 for 
US banks, which reflects different sample periods and the relatively large average size of non-US banks. 
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feature is associated with a more generous financial safety net and a greater potential to 
induce bank risk taking.  
The specifications that use the international sample include several 
macroeconomic and country-level institutional control variables. Inflation is the 
consumer price inflation rate. GDP growth is the rate of real GDP growth. GDP per 
capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant U.S. dollars. As an index of bank 
regulation, Activity restriction is a composite index of regulatory restrictions on bank 
activities from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). Specifically, it is an indicator of the 
degree to which banks face regulatory restrictions on their activities in securities markets, 
insurance, real estate, and their ownership of shares in non-financial firms. Capital 
stringency is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, summarizing information 
about the nature and the magnitude of bank capital requirements, with higher values 
indicating greater stringency. Supervisory power is an index of the power of bank 
supervisory authorities to undertake specific actions to prevent and correct problems at a 
bank, with higher values indicating greater power. Diversification is an index of loan 
diversification guidelines imposed on banks. Finally, Financial freedom is an index of 
financial market freedoms available from the Heritage Foundation.  
 
3.       Empirical results 
            In this section, we first discuss our methodology followed by a presentation of the 
empirical results based on the US and the international data.  
3.1.      Methodology   
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We begin our analysis by examining the relation between firm risks and corporate 
governance for a sample of US banks and non-financial firms:   
, 0 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 ,1i t i t i t i i t i t i tRisk Gov Go Fv dum Xinα β β β γ δ− − −= + + + + ++ ×    (7)  
in which itRisk  is a risk measure for firm i at year t. We use six different measures of risk. 
Specifically, DD, -Leverage and -AVOL measure firm-level risk, while MES, -SRISK 
and COVAR represent a firm’s contribution to the systemic risk. In all cases, a lower 
value for the dependent variable denotes higher risk. , 1i tGov −  is a corporate governance 
variable, in particular either Governance, Entrenchment, or Independence. As banks are 
generally protected by the financial safety net, we expect shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance to have a greater impact on risk for banks than for non-financial firms. To 
test this, we include an interaction term of the relevant corporate governance variable 
with the Findum variable which takes on a value of one for firms that are classified as 
financial firms, and takes on a value of zero otherwise.12 , 1i tX −  is a set of firm-level 
controls. We include firm fixed effects iγ  and year fixed effects tδ , to control for time-
invariant firm-level heterogeneity and macro shocks that affect all firms in a given year. 
In the estimation, we cluster the errors at the firm level. All independent variables are 
lagged by one year to reduce endogeneity concerns.  
For all three governance measures, a higher value of the , 1i tGov − variable indicates 
that corporate governance better serves the interests of shareholders. Shareholders of 
banks could gain more from higher risks compared to nonfinancial firms, as banks tend to 
be protected by the financial safety net. Consistent with a relatively strong relation 
                                                          
12 A firm is classified as financial if it has a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code starting with 6.   
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between shareholder-friendly governance and risk for banks, we expect to find 1 0β <  in 
Eq. (7).  
On account of their too-big-to-fail status, larger banks are expected to benefit 
more from the financial safety net compared to smaller banks. This suggests that more 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance leads to higher bank risk especially in the case 
of large banks. To test this, we estimate the following regression model: 
, 0 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 12 ,3i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tRisk Gov Size Go XSizevα β β β β γ δ− − − − −= + + + + + ++ ×    (8) 
We expect to find 2 0β <  in Eq. (8), consistent with a stronger relation between 
shareholder-friendly governance and risk for larger banks.  
 Allowing for both bank vs. non-financial firm and size heterogeneity, we also 
estimate:  
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  (9)  
In Eq. (9), the variable of interest is the triple interaction term , 1 , 1i t i i tFindum SizeGov − −× ×  
that captures the differential effect of governance on risks for large banks compared to 
large non-financial firms. We expect to find 5 0β < , consistent with the notion that larger 
banks, but not larger non-financial firms, benefit from the financial safety net.  
Finally, we use an international sample of banks to examine the impact of cross-
country differences in the strength of the national financial safety nets. We estimate the 
following model: 
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In Eq. (10), the variables that vary across countries are denoted by the subscript j. , 1j tZ −  is 
a set of country-level controls described in the previous section. We are interested in the 
interaction term , 1ij t jFinancial safety tGov ne− ×  that measures the impact of financial safety 
nets on the governance-risk relation. We expect to find 1 0β < , consistent with the notion 
that bank risks vary more positively with shareholder-friendly corporate governance in 
countries with more generous financial safety nets. 
 In subsection 3.2, we report the results from estimating models (7) to (9) for US 
banks and non-financial firms over the years 1990-2014. Subsection 3.3 provides results 
of the impact of an exogenous regulatory change in board independence on risk. We 
explain our approach in detail in that section. Analogous to models (7) to (9) and as an 
additional check, subsection 3.4 provides the results of regressions that relate equity 
returns during the financial crisis to corporate governance variables for the sample of US 
banks and non-financial firms. In subsection 3.5, we present the results of estimating 
model (10) for an international sample of banks. The international data also allow us to 
use an instrumental variable approach in which we instrument for bank-level governance 
using country-year average governance of non-financial firms. We explain this approach 
in detail in that section.  
3.2.      Corporate governance and risks at US banks and non-financial firms 
In this subsection, we examine the relation between corporate governance and 
firm risk using data on US banks and non-financial firms. To start, Panels A, B and C of 
Table 2 provide the results of estimating Eq. (7) in which we relate the various risk 
measures to either Governance, Entrenchment, or Independence and the interaction of the 
included corporate governance variable with Findum. In Panel A, the interaction term 
23 
 
Governance × Findum has negative coefficients in all six risk regressions that are 
significant throughout except in the -AVOL regression. This provides evidence that 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance is more positively related to stand-alone as 
well as systemic risks for financial firms than for non-financial firms, as financial firms 
potentially benefit from financial safety nets. This effect is economically significant. 
Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the governance variable reduces a 
bank’s distance-to-default by 0.35 (or 0.14 standard deviation), reduces its MES by 
0.0041 (41 basis points or 0.21 standard deviation), and increases its SRISK by 0.89 
billion US dollars (or 0.1 standard deviation), compared to non-financial firms.    
In terms of the control variables, the return on assets variable is positive and 
significant in the DD, -Leverage, and COVAR regressions, suggesting that more 
profitable banks have lower stand-alone and systemic risk. The market-to-book ratio has 
negative and significant coefficients in the DD, MES, and COVAR regressions, and a 
positive and significant coefficient in the –Leverage regression. A higher market-to-book 
ratio thus is associated with a lower distance to default despite a lower leverage. The 
estimated coefficient for the Size variable is negative and significant in the DD, MES, 
and COVAR regressions, while it is positive and significant in the -AVOL and -SRISK 
regressions. The ambiguous relation between bank size and risk could reflect that larger 
banks face greater incentives to take on risks on account of their too-big-to-fail status, 
while they may face lower risks due to better diversified asset portfolios. 
In Panel B, the interaction term Entrenchment × Findum is estimated to be 
negative in all six risk regressions, and statistically significant except for the -AVOL 
regression. Similarly, in Panel C, the interaction term Independence × Findum has 
24 
 
negative and significant coefficients in the -Leverage, -AVOL, MES, and -SRISK 
regressions. Overall, Table 2 provides strong evidence of a more positive relation 
between shareholder-friendly corporate governance and risks at banks than at non-
financial firms. This is consistent with banks having greater opportunities and incentives 
to shift risks to creditors and taxpayers. 
Next, we consider how the relation between corporate governance and bank risk 
is affected by a bank’s size. Bigger banks may be more aggressive in risk-taking, as in 
case of insolvency they may receive a more generous treatment by bank regulators due to 
their too-big-to-fail status. Hence, the relatively positive relation between governance and 
risk for banks compared to non-banks shown in Table 2 could be driven by the larger 
banks in the sample. To examine the role of bank size, we interact bank size with our 
measures of governance according to Eq. (8) described in the previous section, and report 
the results in Table 3.  
In Panel A of this table, the interaction term Governance × Size has negative and 
significant coefficients in the DD, MES, -SRISK, and COVAR regressions. This suggests 
that shareholder-friendly corporate governance increases stand-alone and systemic risks 
especially for larger banks, consistent with a stronger financial safety net protection of 
larger banks. In Panel B, the interaction term Entrenchment × Size has negative 
coefficients in all six risk regressions that are significant in all cases except for the 
COVAR specification. Finally, in Panel C the interaction of Independence and Size has 
negative and significant coefficients in the DD, -Leverage, MES, and -SRISK 
regressions. Overall, for all three governance measures we find strong evidence that 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance is more positively related to riskiness for big 
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banks rather than small banks. These results are consistent with the notion that larger 
banks have greater incentives to take on additional risk due to their too-big-to-fail status. 
The results we report are economically significant. For instance, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in Governance reduces distance-to-default by 0.36 and MES by 0.0068 (or 68 
basis points) for banks that have assets of $5 billion. The corresponding decreases in 
distance-to-default and MES for banks with assets of $50 billion are 0.79 and 0.0152 (or 
152 basis points), respectively.   
We expect the tendency of size to accentuate the positive relation between 
corporate governance and risk to be more pronounced in the case of banks compared to 
non-financial firms, as even very large non-financial firms are generally not deemed to be 
systemically important.13 To test this, we estimate regression model (9) as described in 
the previous section in which we interact the pertinent corporate governance variable, the 
Size variable, and the Findum variable. The results are reported in Table 4.  
In Panel A of this table, the triple interaction term of Governance × Size × Findum 
has negative coefficients that are significant in five risk regressions (of DD, -Leverage, 
MES, -SRISK, and COVAR). The triple interaction, however, has a positive and 
significant coefficient in the -AVOL regression. Hence, the triple interaction variable 
varies nonuniformly with leverage and asset risk (as reflected in the -Leverage and -
AVOL regressions), while the overall effect on the distance to default variable – 
reflecting variation in both leverage and asset risk – is negative and significant. The 
evidence of Panel A thus suggests that larger firms with shareholder-friendly corporate 
                                                          
13 Moreover, comparing banks to non-financial firms allows us to control for general advantages associated 
with firm size that may affect both the level of governance as well its impact on risk-taking across the two 
types of firms. 
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governance represent greater stand-alone risk (as measured by the distance to default) and 
greater systemic risk, especially if they are banks rather than non-financial firms.  
In Panel B, the triple interaction of Entrenchment, Size and Findum is estimated 
with negative and significant coefficients in four risk regressions (of DD, -Leverage, 
MES, and COVAR), while in Panel C the interaction of Independence, Size and Findum 
is negative and significant in four risk regressions (of DD, -Leverage, MES, and -
SRISK). Taken together, the results of Table 4 strongly suggest that larger firms with 
strong corporate governance are riskier especially if they are banks, consistent with a too-
big-to-fail status of banks. 
 3.3.     The impact of US reforms towards greater board independence on risk-taking 
Corporate governance can, to some extent, be endogenously determined. For 
instance, a strong preference for risk on the part of a bank’s shareholders may jointly give 
rise to both considerable bank risk-taking and shareholder-friendly corporate governance. 
As indicated before, to alleviate concerns about endogeneity we include bank fixed 
effects in all regressions with time-varying data, thereby controlling for any time-
invariant unobservable bank characteristics that affect both bank corporate governance 
and bank risk. 
To further address potential endogeneity, we examine the impact of new 
regulations announced by the NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges in 2003 requiring 
firms to have more than 50% independent directors on the risk-taking behavior of US 
banks and non-financial firms.14 Listed firms were required to comply with these new 
                                                          
14 Several papers have used the introduction of NYSE and NASDAQ rules requiring majority board 
independence, and the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations requiring majority independence in the audit committee 
as exogenous shocks to governance. See, for instance, Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010), 
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rules starting in 2004.15 The reforms were, to a large extent, a response to fraudulent 
accounting practices at high-profile non-financial firms such as Enron, and were unlikely 
to be endogenous to the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions. The regulatory 
changes provide a quasi-experiment suitable for a difference-in-difference estimation, as 
some firms already had a majority of independent directors on their boards and thus 
complied with the new rules at the time they were announced (non-affected), while other 
firms had to increase the number of independent directors before the rules came into 
effect (affected). 
Specifically, we examine the change in our six risk measures for the affected and 
non-affected firms after the implementation of the reforms. As before, we also examine 
whether risk-taking behavior changed more for larger banks compared to smaller banks. 
To do this, we estimate the following model over the time period from 2000 to 2005: 
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  (11) 
Affectedi is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for firms that were non-
compliant with the rules prior to the implementation of the reforms. In our sample, about 
12% of banks were affected by the new rules.16 Postt is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one for the time period 2003-2005 comprising the announcement and 
                                                          
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008), and Armstrong, Core, and Guay 
(2014).  
15 NYSE-listed and NASDAQ-listed firms were required to implement the new requirement by their first 
annual meeting occurring after January 15, 2004, but no later than October 31, 2004 and October 15, 2004, 
respectively. 
16 Consistent with Armstrong, Core, and Guay (2014), we find that initially non-compliant firms had a 
significant increase in independent directors compared to initially compliant firms. 
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implementation of the reforms. We include firm fixed effects ( iγ ) as well as time trend 
variables (τ  and τ  × Affectedi) to capture potentially differential pre-reform trends in the 
dependent variables for affected firms. 17   
The results of estimating Eq. (11) for the six risk measures are reported in Table 5 
for the sample of US banks. The variable of interest is the triple interaction term, Postt × 
Affectedi × Sizei,t-1.18 The coefficients on the triple interaction term are negative and 
statistically significant in all six risk regressions except for the COVAR regression. This 
suggests that risk increased for larger affected banks after they were compelled by the 
new regulations to increase their share of independent board members. This provides 
evidence that an exogenously determined increase in board independence caused larger 
banks to increase their stand-alone and systemic risk, consistent with a more generous 
financial safety net treatment of larger banks. 
Next, we consider two sets of additional tests of the impact of the NYSE and 
NASDAQ reforms towards greater board independence on firm risk. First, we expand the 
sample of US banks to include US non-financial firms. This enables us to test whether the 
reforms increased risk more at affected large banks than non-financial firms. We do this 
by including a quadruple interaction of Post, Affected, Size and Findum into regression 
model (11). The results are reported in Table 6. The regressions include all the interaction 
terms and control variables, but we report only the coefficients on the quadruple 
                                                          
17 An alternative approach is to examine changes in board independence from 2000 (before there was any 
information about the impending change in regulations) to 2004 using the minimum change in board 
independence required to be compliant as an instrument following Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010). 
We find that the change in the share of independent board members had a positive impact on bank stand-
alone and systemic risk using this approach. 
18 We have also estimated a baseline model examining the impact for all affected banks based on 
Post×Affected. This baseline impact of the regulatory change is not significant for the average bank.    
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interaction term for brevity. In Panel A of Table 6, we find that this quadruple interaction 
variable has negative and significant coefficients in all six risk variable regressions. This 
means that large affected banks increased their stand-alone and systemic risks more 
compared to large affected non-financial firms. These results are consistent with our 
earlier results and the notion that only large banks (and not large non-financial firms) are 
seen as benefiting from the financial safety net on account of their ‘too-big-to-fail’ status. 
Second, in Panels B and C we show the results of regressions analogous to Table 
5 in which we counterfactually construct the Affected variable on the assumption that the 
reforms were announced and implemented three years later and three years earlier, 
respectively. In Panel B, the quadruple interaction variable has positive coefficients (that 
are statistically significant in the DD and -SRISK regressions), suggesting that large 
(actually) affected large banks did not become riskier relative to large affected non-
financial firms in the placebo reform period after 2005. Furthermore, in Panel C the 
quadruple interaction term is not statistically significant in any of the six risk variable 
regressions for a placebo reform period after 1999. The results of these placebo tests lend 
additional credence to our interpretation of the results in Panel A. Overall, our results 
provide evidence that greater board independence causes higher stand-alone and systemic 
risk especially at larger banks, consistent with stronger financial safety net protection of 
these banks. 
 
3.4. Realized risk during the financial crisis 
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In this subsection, we examine the relation between corporate governance in 
2007, and the equity returns of US banks and non-financial firms during the financial 
crisis in 2008. Whereas our prior analyses focused on ex-ante measures of risk, we use 
equity returns during the crisis as a measure of ex-post or realized risk. In particular, the 
return measure is the average monthly stock return from January to September 2008, 
before the implementation of various liquidity and capital support programs by the US 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve. We use the same regression specification provided in 
Eq. (7), (8) and (9), with returns as the dependent variable.  Since we examine average 
returns during the crisis, the sample is only one cross-section. The results are reported in 
Table 7.  
Analogous to Table 2, regressions (1)-(3) relate equity returns to a governance 
variable (either Governance, Entrenchment, or Independence) and its interaction with 
Findum. In regressions (2) and (3), the coefficients of the interaction terms Entrenchment 
× Findum and Independence × Findum are negative and significant, which suggest that 
banks with more shareholder-friendly corporate governance experienced lower equity 
returns during the financial crisis compared to non-banks. Analogous to Table 3, 
regressions (4)-(6) each include a distinct corporate governance variable and its 
interaction with Size; these regressions are estimated for the sample of banks only. The 
interaction variables Governance × Size and Independence × Size have negative and 
significant coefficient in regressions (4) and (6), providing evidence that banks with 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance had low stock returns during the crisis 
especially if they were large. Our finding that large US banks with more independent 
boards had low returns during the crisis is consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) 
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who show that equity returns during the crisis were negatively related to board 
independence for a sample of international banks. Finally, following Table 4 regressions 
(7)-(9) of Table 7 consider how the relationship between shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance and equity returns during the crisis jointly depends on Size and Findum. The 
triple interactions Governance × Findum × Size and Independence × Findum × Size enter 
with negative and significant coefficients in regressions (7) and (9), indicating that equity 
returns during the crisis varied negatively with shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
especially for firms that were large banks. The evidence that large banks with 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance realized relatively low equity returns during 
the financial crisis is consistent with our earlier findings in Tables 2-4 that these firms 
displayed relatively high ex-ante stand-alone and systemic risk measures. 
 
3.5.      Corporate governance and risk for international banks  
In this subsection, we extend our analysis to an international sample of banks.19  
The international sample allows us to take into account cross-country variation in the 
strength of the financial safety net. The international data, in particular, enable us to 
examine whether shareholder-friendly corporate governance and bank risk are more 
positively related in countries that have stronger financial safety nets. We test this by 
estimating Eq. (10), which includes an interaction of the Governance variable with the 
Financial safety net variable, as applied to our measures of stand-alone and systemic risk. 
In Panel A of Table 8, this interaction variable is estimated with negative coefficients in 
                                                          
19 In unreported regressions based on the international data, we confirm the results reported in section 3.2. 
In particular, shareholder-friendly corporate governance is more positively related to various stand-alone 
and systemic risks for banks than for non-financial firms, for big banks than for small banks, and for big 
banks than for big non-financial firms.  
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all six regressions, and it is significant in the DD, -AVOL, and MES regressions. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that more shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance increases stand-alone and systemic risks in banks located in countries with 
stronger financial safety nets, since it is in these countries that distressed banks are more 
likely to obtain generous support and bailouts.20  
To ascertain the economic significance of the results, we can compare the impact 
of a one-standard-deviation increase in the corporate governance variable on risk 
variables in two countries for which the financial safety net variables differ by one 
standard deviation. The estimated coefficients then imply that the increase in the 
corporate governance variable reduces the DD, -AVOL, and MES variables by 2.3%, 
1.7%, and 4.7% more in a country with a relatively strong financial safety net.  
In terms of the control variables, the inflation variable is positive and significant 
in the DD and MES regressions, but negative and significant in the COVAR regression. 
The ambiguous relationship between inflation and risk may reflect that inflation provides 
banks with additional profit opportunities in a more uncertain macroeconomic 
environment. The coefficient for GDP growth is positive and significant in several of the 
risk variable regressions, as bank risks are likely to be reduced by economic growth. The 
GDP per capita variable has negative and significant coefficients in some of risk variable 
regressions. This result could reflect that banks in wealthier countries are protected by a 
more credible financial safety net, which induces them to take on more risk. The Activity 
restriction variable has negative and significant coefficients in the DD and COVAR 
regressions, perhaps due to the fact that activity restrictions reduce risk diversification 
                                                          
20 In unreported results, we also find that the positive relation between Governance and bank risk is 
stronger for banks that are larger and located in countries with stronger financial safety nets. 
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options for banks. Furthermore, stronger diversification guidelines imposed on banks are 
associated with higher bank risks in several instances, while the relation between 
supervisory power and financial freedom on the one hand and bank risks on the other 
appear to be ambiguous.  
To alleviate the concern for potential endogeneity, we have included firm fixed 
effects as well as considered an exogenous shock to board independence in the US. While 
we do not have a comparable exogenous shock in corporate governance for the 
international sample, we use an instrumental-variable approach to confirm the robustness 
of the results reported in Panel A of Table 8. In particular, we instrument a bank’s 
Governance variable by using the average of this variable for all non-financial firms in 
the same country and in the same year. We consider such country-year averages a valid 
instrument, as a shock to a bank’s risk is unlikely to affect the corporate governance of 
non-financial firms. Similar IV approaches were previously used by John, Litov, and 
Yeung (2008), Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), and Laeven and Levine 
(2009).  
Panel B of Table 8 reports IV results for regressions that are analogous to those 
seen in Panel A. Columns 1 and 2 show the 1st stage regressions of the Governance and 
Governance × Financial safety net variables, respectively. In these two regressions, the 
instruments Governance non-financials, and Governance non-financials × Financial safety 
net have coefficients 0.955 and 0.927, respectively, and they are significant at 1%. In the 
2nd stage regressions reported in columns 3-8, the instrumented Governance × Financial 
safety net variable has negative coefficients which are significant in all regressions except 
the -SRISK and COVAR regressions. Based on these results, we conclude that the 
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negative relations between the stand-alone and systemic risk variables and the interaction 
of Governance and Financial safety net we reported in Panel A of Table 8 are robust to 
using an instrumental-variable approach.21 This cross-country evidence supports the 
hypothesis that more shareholder-friendly corporate governance leads to more stand-
alone and systemic risk if the financial safety net is stronger.  
 
4.         Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that more shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance is associated with greater stand-alone and systemic risks for financial 
institutions compared to non-financial firms, consistent with the notion that banks benefit 
more from financial safety nets.  Furthermore, shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
is associated with greater risk-taking by large banks compared to small banks, consistent 
with larger banks benefiting from too-big-to-fail guarantees. For the sample of 
international banks, we also find that the relations between shareholder-friendly 
governance and bank risks are stronger in countries with more generous financial safety 
nets. This is again consistent with the notion that banks try to shift risk onto the financial 
safety net to increase equity value.  
 To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we examine changes in risk-taking around an 
exogenous regulatory change that increased board independence for some banks but not 
others. We find that regulatory reform towards greater board independence approved in 
2003 by US exchanges increased stand-alone and systemic risks more at larger banks that 
were affected by this reform as compared to non-financial firms.  For the sample of 
                                                          
21 In equity return regressions for the international sample of banks analogous to Table 8, we did not find a 
significant impact of the interaction of Governance and Financial safety net (unreported).  
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international banks, we use an instrumental-variable approach to confirm our findings. 
These results strongly suggest a causal link between shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance and bank risk-taking.   
The interaction between corporate governance and the financial safety net in 
determining bank insolvency and systemic risks has important implications for public 
policies towards corporate governance at banks. In particular, the case for more 
shareholder-friendly corporate governance at banks is much weaker than in the case of 
non-financial firms. In the case of banks, particularly large ones, corporate governance 
that better aligns managerial incentives with shareholder interests may exacerbate the 
excessive risk-taking resulting from bank shareholders’ incentives to exploit the financial 
safety. This paper’s finding that regulations towards greater board independence in the 
US increased the riskiness of the affected banks relative to non-financial firms provides 
suggestive evidence of this. In the second-best world in which mispriced financial safety 
nets and too-big-to-fail policies exist, ‘better’ corporate governance could produce worse 
outcomes. To prevent this, a first priority should be regulatory and safety net reforms to 
address too-big-to-fail issues and to reduce moral hazard leading to excess risk-taking of 
banks. After such reforms, the case for ‘better’ corporate governance at banks would 
become much stronger. 
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Appendix. Variable definitions, data sources, governance attributes, and country coverage 
Table A1. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable name Definition Data source 
Risk and return variables 
DD Merton’s (1974) distance-to-default measure computed as the difference between the asset 
value of a firm and the face value of its debt scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s 
asset value 
Authors’ calculations 
Leverage Market leverage computed by dividing the sum of the market value of equity and the book 
value of liabilities by the market value of equity 
Authors’ calculations 
AVOL Asset volatility computed using the Merton (1974) model Authors’ calculations 
MES Average bank stock return when market return is in the lowest 5% bracket in a given year  
SRISK Expected capital shortfall in billions of US dollars when the market return is in the lowest 5% 
bracket in a given year  
Authors’ calculations 
COVAR Conditional value at risk measure as the change in the value at risk (VaR) of the system when 
the firm is at the 5th percentile minus the VaR of the system when the institution is at the 50th 
percentile in terms of its stock returns 
Authors’ calculations 
Return Average monthly stock return during the financial crisis from January to September 2008 Author’s calculations 
Governance variables   
Governance Corporate governance index based on 44 attributes listed in Table A2 ISS/CGQ 
Entrenchment Entrenchment index of executive entrenchment based on six governance provisions: staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments with higher values indicating 
better governance   
ISS/Riskmetrics  
Independence Share of board members who are not affiliated with the firm ISS/Riskmetrics  
Affected Dummy variable set to one for firms that were not compliant with the exchange rules requiring 
firms to have at least 50% of their board members to independent in 2003. 
ISS/Riskmetrics 
Firm control variables 
Size Logarithm of total assets CRSP and Compustat 
Global 
Market-to-book Market to book ratio computed as market capitalization divided by the book value of equity CRSP, Compustat North 
America, and Compustat 
Global  
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Return on assets Net income divided by total assets CRSP, Compustat North 
America, and Compustat 
Global 
Macro and institutional control variables 
Financial safety net Sum of first four principal components with an eigenvalue exceeding one based on 8 deposit 
insurance scheme design features as follows:  (1) coverage of foreign currency deposits, (2) 
coverage of interbank deposits, (3) an absence of coinsurance, (4) coverage per depositor per 
bank per account, (5) funded ex ante, (6) funded by government, (7) risk-insensitive insurance 
premium, (8) the ratio of insurance coverage and deposits per capita, with a higher value for 
each feature suggesting a more generous financial safety net and more severe moral hazard 
Authors’ calculations 
based on deposit insurance 
data in year 2003 from 
Demirguc-Kunt, 
Karacaovali, and Laeven 
(2005) 
Inflation Consumer price inflation rate  World Development 
Indicators 
GDP growth Rate of real GDP growth World Development 
Indicators 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2005 U.S. dollars World Development 
Indicators 
Activity restrictions Index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities  Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004) 
Capital stringency Index of regulatory oversight of bank capital with higher values indicate greater stringency  Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004) 
Supervisory power Index of power of bank supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent and correct 
problems with higher values indicating greater power 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004) 
Diversification Index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks with higher values indicating more 
diversification 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004) 
Financial freedom Index of financial freedom with higher values indicating greater freedom Heritage Foundation 
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Table A2. Corporate governance attributes  
Board attributes 
1. All directors attended 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse 
2. CEO serves on the boards of two or fewer public companies 
3. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors 
4. Board size is greater than 5 but less than 16 
5. CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction 
6. No former CEO on the board 
7. Compensation committee composed solely of independent outsiders 
8. Chairman and CEO are separated or there is a lead director 
9.Nominating committee composed solely of independent outsiders 
10.Governance committee exists and met in the past year 
11.Shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies 
12.Governance guidelines are publicly disclosed 
13.Annually elected board (no staggered board) 
14.Policy exists on outside directorships (four or fewer boards is the limit) 
15.Shareholders have cumulative voting rights 
16.Shareholder approval is required to increase/decrease board size 
17.Majority vote requirement to amend charter/bylaws 
18.Board has the express authority to hire its own advisors 
19.Performance of the board is reviewed regularly 
20.Board-approved succession plan in place for the CEO 
21.Outside directors meet without CEO and disclose number of times met 
22.Directors are required to submit resignation upon a change in job 
23.Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can do so only under limited circumstances 
24.Does not ignore shareholder proposal 
25.Qualifies for proxy contest defenses combination points 
Compensation and ownership attributes 
26.Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements 
27.Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines 
28.No interlocks among compensation committee members 
29.Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock 
30.All stock-incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval 
31.Options grants align with company performance and reasonable burn rate 
32.Company expenses stock options 
33.All directors with more than one year of service own stock 
34.Officers' and directors' stock ownership is at least 1% but not over 30% of total shares outstanding 
35.Repricing is prohibited 
Auditing attributes 
36.Board independence: Audit committee 
37.Consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors 
38.Auditors ratified at most recent annual meeting 
Antitakeover attributes 
39.Single class, common 
40.Majority vote requirement to approve mergers (not supermajority)  
41.Shareholders may call special meetings 
42.Shareholder may act by written consent 
43.Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved 
44.Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred 
Source: Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) 
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Table A3. Country coverage 
Country name Frequency Percentage of the sample 
Australia 83 1.88 
Austria 15 0.34 
Belgium 20 0.45 
Canada 33 0.75 
Denmark 9 0.2 
Finland 8 0.18 
France 21 0.48 
Germany 42 0.95 
Greece 14 0.32 
Hong Kong 122 2.76 
Ireland 9 0.2 
Italy 31 0.7 
Japan 294 6.66 
Netherlands 18 0.41 
Norway 10 0.23 
Portugal 12 0.27 
Singapore 71 1.61 
Spain 10 0.23 
Sweden 29 0.66 
Switzerland 30 0.68 
United Kingdom 167 3.78 
United States 3,367 76.25 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the sample of US banks, Panel B for the sample of US non-financial firms, 
and Panel C for the sample of international banks. DD is Merton’s (1974) distance-to-default measure computed as 
the difference between the asset value of a firm and the face value of its debt scaled by the standard deviation of the 
firm’s asset value. Leverage is market leverage computed by dividing the sum of the market value of equity and the 
book value of liabilities by the market value of equity. AVOL is asset volatility computed using the Merton (1974) 
model. MES is marginal expected shortfall computed as the average stock return of a firm when the market return is 
in the bottom 5th percentile in a given year. SRISK is expected capital shortfall when the market return is in the 
lowest 5% bracket in a given year. COVAR is conditional value at risk measure computed as the change in the value 
at risk (VaR) of the system when the firm is at the 5th percentile minus the VaR of the system when the institution is 
at the 50th percentile in terms of its stock returns. Return is the average monthly stock return during the financial 
crisis from January to September 2008. Governance is an overall governance index. Entrenchment is an index of 
executive entrenchment with higher values indicating better governance. Independence is the share of board 
members not affiliated with the firm. Return on asset is net income divided by total assets. Market-to-book is the 
market to book ratio computed as market capitalization divided by the book value of equity. Size is the log of total 
assets. Financial safety net is an index based on 8 deposit insurance design features with higher values indicating a 
more generous safety net. Inflation is the percentage annual change in the consumer price index. GDP growth is the 
real rate of GDP growth. GDP per capita is the GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Activity 
restriction is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities. Capital stringency is an index of regulatory 
oversight of bank capital with higher values indicating greater stringency. Supervisory power is an index of the 
power of bank supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems with higher values 
indicating greater supervisory power. Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks with 
higher values indicating greater diversification. Financial freedom is an index of government regulations and 
controls on the financial sector with higher values indicating greater freedom. Data in Panels A and B are for the 
period 1990-2014, while data in Panel C is for the period 2004-2008.  
 
Panel A: US banks  Obs Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
DD            6,664  5.33 2.50 3.74 5.18 6.72 
Leverage            6,638  9.01 16.41 3.40 6.24 9.42 
AVOL            6,664  0.10 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.12 
MES         6,855 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
SRISK         6,642 -0.42 8.77 -0.81 -0.11 0.01 
COVAR            6,732  -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Return            712 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 
Governance            3,700  0.62 0.09 0.56 0.62 0.68 
Entrenchment            4,416  -2.35 1.45 -3.00 -2.00 -1.00 
Independence            3,107  0.70 0.17 0.60 0.73 0.82 
Return on assets            7,264  0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Market-to-book            7,264  2.05 1.93 1.16 1.63 2.31 
Size            7,264  8.27 2.02 6.80 8.21 9.54 
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Panel B: US non-financials           Obs. 
 
Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
DD  32,374  5.22 2.87 3.17 4.78 6.77 
Leverage  32,065  2.07 4.04 1.21 1.50 2.10 
AVOL  32,374  0.30 0.21 0.16 0.26 0.39 
MES 33,310 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
SRISK 32,158 -3.22 12.65 -1.67 -0.47 -0.13 
COVAR  32,786  -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Return 2,744 -0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 
Governance  14,311  0.63 0.09 0.57 0.64 0.70 
Entrenchment  25,629  -2.31 1.40 -3.00 -2.00 -1.00 
Independence 19,212 0.69 0.17 0.57 0.71 0.83 
Return on assets  34,930  0.01 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.08 
Market-to-book  34,930  3.08 3.59 1.28 2.02 3.40 
Size  34,930  6.69 1.86 5.50 6.66 7.87 
Panel C: Non-US banks                  Obs 
 
Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
DD 1,049 5.93 2.98 3.78 5.31 7.58 
Leverage 1,041 9.58 10.31 2.10 5.47 13.68 
AVOL 1,049 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.17 
MES 1,046 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
SRISK 1,025 0.800  17.02 1.73 -0.30 1.31 
COVAR 917 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Return 935 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 
Return on assets 1,049 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Market-to-book 1,049 2.08 2.12 1.06 1.50 2.36 
Size 1,049 9.76 1.86 8.37 9.84 11.04 
Governance 1,049 0.56 0.07 0.50 0.55 0.61 
Country level variables 
 
      
Financial safety net 566 -0.52 1.69 -0.38 -0.31 -0.30 
Inflation 
 
1,049 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 
GDP growth 1,049 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
GDP per capita 1,049 35.30 6.70 31.87 35.78 37.72 
Activity restriction 1,049 6.09 2.11 4.00 7.00 8.00 
Capital stringency 1,049 4.99 1.20 4.00 5.00 6.00 
Supervisory power 1,049 10.62 2.18 8.00 11.00 12.00 
Diversification 1,049 1.51 0.53 1.00 2.00 2.00 
Financial freedom 1,049 67.95 21.66 50.00 70.00 90.00 
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Table 2. Corporate governance and risk at banks vs. non-financial firms 
 
The dependent variables in the 6 columns are DD, -Leverage, -AVOL, MES, -SRISK and COVAR. DD is Merton’s 
(1974) distance-to-default measure computed as the difference between the asset value of a firm and the face value 
of its debt scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value. Leverage is market leverage computed by 
dividing the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities by the market value of equity. AVOL 
is asset volatility computed using the Merton (1974) model. MES is marginal expected shortfall computed as the 
average stock return of a firm when the market return is in the bottom 5th percentile in a given year. SRISK is 
expected capital shortfall when the market return is in the lowest 5% bracket in a given year. COVAR is conditional 
value at risk measure computed as the change in the value at risk (VaR) of the system when the firm is at the 5th 
percentile minus the VaR of the system when the institution is at the 50th percentile in terms of its stock returns. We 
multiply Leverage, AVOL and SRISK by -1 so that higher values indicate lower risk consistent with the other risk 
measures. Return on assets is net income divided by total assets. Market-to-book is the market to book ratio 
computed as market capitalization divided by the book value of equity. Size is the log of total assets. Findum is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm is a financial firm. In Panel A Governance is an overall 
governance index. In Panel B Entrenchment is an index of executive entrenchment with higher values indicating 
better governance. In Panel C Independence is the share of board members not affiliated with the firm. Return on 
assets, Market-to-book, and Size are included in the regressions but not reported in Panels B and C. All regressions 
include firm and year fixed effects. T-statistics based on errors clustered at the firm level are provided in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Panel A: Governance DD -Leverage -AVOL MES -SRISK COVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Return on assets 1.594*** 2.289*** 0.048 -0.000 -0.076 0.002*** 
 (9.657) (3.646) (1.591) (-0.112) (-0.272) (3.616) 
Market-to-book -0.015* 0.088*** 0.001 -0.001*** -0.008 -0.000*** 
 (-1.850) (4.168) (1.318) (-6.018) (-0.410) (-3.884) 
Size -0.526*** 0.079 0.081*** -0.008*** 0.351* -0.001*** 
 (-6.717) (0.216) (10.204) (-8.071) (1.806) (-3.961) 
Governance -0.158 7.684*** -0.011 -0.007 1.317 0.002 
 (-0.359) (3.826) (-0.303) (-1.550) (1.211) (1.284) 
Governance × Findum -3.876*** -47.991*** -0.032 -0.046*** -9.858** -0.016*** 
 (-4.446) (-4.036) (-0.714) (-4.718) (-2.149) (-4.129) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 16,723 16,194 16,723 16,888 16,194 16,463 
R-squared 0.820 0.497 0.809 0.708 0.819 0.654 
 
  
Panel B: Entrenchment           
Entrenchment 0.011 0.276*** 0.005*** 0.084*** -0.343 0.000*** 
 (0.364) (3.500) (3.261) (3.810) (-1.472) (6.804) 
Entrenchment × Findum -0.155*** -1.037** -0.003 -0.361*** -0.848* -0.001*** 
  (-3.261) (-2.052) (-1.435) (-6.802) (-1.853) (-7.685) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 27,879 27,974 27,879 28,883 28,071 28,656 
R-squared 0.744 0.523 0.805 0.702 0.695 0.553 
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Panel C: Board independence           
Independence 0.168 1.450*** 0.022* 0.217 0.992 0.000 
 (0.909) (4.884) (1.857) (1.540) (1.222) (1.222) 
Independence × Findum -0.451 -12.074*** -0.075*** -1.196*** -16.003*** -0.000 
 (-1.131) (-3.954) (-3.252) (-3.233) (-2.807) (-0.410) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 20,435 20,704 20,435 21,390 20,801 21,169 
R-squared 0.762 0.507 0.807 0.683 0.788 0.515 
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Table 3. Corporate governance, risk and bank size 
The dependent variables in the 6 columns are DD, -Leverage, -AVOL, MES, -SRISK and COVAR. DD is Merton’s 
(1974) distance-to-default measure computed as the difference between the asset value of a firm and the face value 
of its debt scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value. Leverage is market leverage computed by 
dividing the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities by the market value of equity. AVOL 
is asset volatility computed using the Merton (1974) model. MES is marginal expected shortfall computed as the 
average stock return of a firm when the market return is in the bottom 5th percentile in a given year. SRISK is 
expected capital shortfall when the market return is in the lowest 5% bracket in a given year. COVAR is conditional 
value at risk measure computed as the change in the value at risk (VaR) of the system when the firm is at the 5th 
percentile minus the VaR of the system when the institution is at the 50th percentile in terms of its stock returns. We 
multiply Leverage, AVOL and SRISK by -1 so that higher values indicate lower risk consistent with the other risk 
measures. Return on assets is net income divided by total assets. Market-to-book is the market to book ratio 
computed as market capitalization divided by the book value of equity. Size is the log of total assets. In Panel A 
Governance is an overall governance index. In Panel B Entrenchment is an index of executive entrenchment with 
higher values indicating better governance. In Panel C Independence is the share of board members not affiliated 
with the firm. Return on assets and Market-to-book are included in the regressions but not reported. All regressions 
include firm and year fixed effects. T-statistics based on errors clustered at the firm level are provided in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Panel A: Governance DD -Leverage -AVOL MES -SRISK COVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size 0.797* 3.318 0.035** 0.017*** 10.134*** 0.002 
 (1.858) (0.898) (2.179) (4.280) (2.696) (1.338) 
Governance 13.607*** 25.886 -0.036 0.264*** 143.332*** 0.045*** 
 (3.244) (0.896) (-0.223) (6.645) (2.699) (3.373) 
Governance × Size -2.066*** -4.988 -0.008 -0.040*** -19.471*** -0.006*** 
 (-4.114) (-1.043) (-0.407) (-7.891) (-2.692) (-3.979) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,414 3,334 3,414 3,449 3,334 3,356 
R-squared 0.808 0.505 0.869 0.726 0.356 0.651 
 
Panel B: Entrenchment           
Size 0.406*** -1.323*** -0.013** 0.000 -0.021 -0.001* 
 (2.908) (-3.575) (-2.243) (0.194) (-0.014) (-1.874) 
Entrenchment 1.170*** 2.131*** 0.032** 0.016*** 8.322** 0.000 
 (4.595) (3.068) (2.035) (6.561) (2.193) (0.106) 
Entrenchment × Size -0.113*** -0.159** -0.003* -0.001*** -0.857** -0.001 
 (-4.674) (-2.143) (-1.956) (-6.385) (-2.025) (-0.423) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,054 4,097 4,054 4,215 4,101 4,189 
R-squared 0.767 0.502 0.858 0.823 0.360 0.581 
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Panel C: Board independence           
Size 0.347 0.284 -0.049*** -0.000 7.999** -0.001*** 
 (1.481) (0.580) (-4.815) (-0.077) (2.517) (-2.940) 
Independence 5.031* 27.904*** 0.156 0.037*** 124.680*** 0.001 
 (1.902) (6.264) (1.594) (2.590) (3.172) (0.015) 
Independence × Size -0.459* -3.042*** -0.014 -0.004** -14.035*** -0.002 
  (-1.740) (-6.161) (-1.437) (-2.390) (-3.131) (-0.085) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,809 2,880 2,809 2,952 2,884 2,922 
R-squared 0.785 0.497 0.864 0.806 0.451 0.516 
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Table 4. Corporate governance, risk and size at banks vs. non-financial firms 
The dependent variables in the 6 columns are DD, -Leverage, -AVOL, MES, -SRISK and COVAR. DD is Merton’s 
(1974) distance-to-default measure computed as the difference between the asset value of a firm and the face value 
of its debt scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value. Leverage is market leverage computed by 
dividing the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities by the market value of equity. AVOL 
is asset volatility computed using the Merton (1974) model. MES is marginal expected shortfall computed as the 
average stock return of a firm when the market return is in the bottom 5th percentile in a given year. SRISK is 
expected capital shortfall when the market return is in the lowest 5% bracket in a given year. COVAR is conditional 
value at risk measure computed as the change in the value at risk (VaR) of the system when the firm is at the 5th 
percentile minus the VaR of the system when the institution is at the 50th percentile in terms of its stock returns. We 
multiply Leverage, AVOL and SRISK by -1 so that higher values indicate lower risk consistent with the other risk 
measures. Return on assets is net income divided by total assets.  Market-to-book is the market to book ratio 
computed as market capitalization divided by the book value of equity. Size is the log of total assets. Findum is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm is a financial firm. In Panel A, Governance is an overall 
governance index. In Panel B Entrenchment is an index of executive entrenchment with higher values indicating 
better governance. In Panel C Independence is the share of board members not affiliated with the firm. Return on 
assets and Market-to-book are included in the regressions but not reported.  All regressions include firm and year 
fixed effects. T-statistics based on errors clustered at the firm level are provided in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Panel A:  Governance DD -Leverage -AVOL MES -SRISK COVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size 0.491*** 1.198** 0.112*** 0.002 3.285*** 0.004*** 
 (3.848) (2.171) (8.020) (1.583) (5.364) (6.390) 
Governance 5.837*** 4.881* 0.289** 0.093*** 27.520*** 0.046*** 
 (5.232) (1.757) (2.046) (6.946) (5.594) (9.085) 
Governance × Size -0.983*** -0.108 -0.050*** -0.017*** -4.540*** -0.007*** 
 (-5.877) (-0.160) (-2.614) (-8.413) (-5.128) (-8.990) 
Governance × Findum 5.782* 29.967 -0.391* 0.179*** 116.015** 0.033* 
 (1.822) (1.005) (-1.842) (4.373) (2.183) (1.927) 
Findum × Size 0.039 -3.879 -0.047** 0.012*** 6.880* -0.002 
 (0.122) (-1.034) (-2.170) (3.065) (1.812) (-1.048) 
Governance × Findum × Size -0.835** -8.304* 0.059** -0.025*** -14.873** -0.004** 
 (-2.103) (-1.711) (2.222) (-4.637) (-2.055) (-1.976) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 16,723 16,194 16,723 16,888 16,194 16,463 
R-squared 0.822 0.504 0.809 0.714 0.825 0.640 
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Panel B: Entrenchment           
Size 0.189*** -0.321*** -0.044*** -0.046 5.933*** 0.001*** 
 (2.807) (-4.924) (-12.442) (-1.189) (4.974) (4.239) 
Entrenchment 0.317*** 0.029 -0.008 0.053 5.576*** 0.001*** 
 (3.562) (0.478) (-1.297) (0.721) (3.732) (10.723) 
Entrenchment × Size -0.040*** 0.015* 0.000 0.003 -0.810*** -0.000*** 
 (-3.583) (1.920) (0.693) (0.320) (-3.666) (-9.182) 
Entrenchment × Findum 0.392 1.496* 0.016 0.987*** 1.645 0.000 
 (1.633) (1.931) (1.257) (3.647) (0.405) (0.953) 
Findum × Size 0.165 -0.367 0.024*** -0.067 -6.357*** -0.001 
 (1.395) (-1.475) (5.355) (-0.875) (-3.822) (-0.550) 
Entrenchment × Findum × Size -0.051** -0.171* -0.002 -0.136*** -0.018 -0.000* 
  (-2.002) (-1.946) (-1.398) (-4.633) (-0.037) (-1.759) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 27,879 27,974 27,879 28,883 28,071 29,848 
R-squared 0.745 0.525 0.805 0.705 0.708 0.921 
Panel C: Board independence           
Size -0.223** -0.081 -0.054*** -0.216*** 2.439*** -0.001*** 
 (-2.105) (-0.735) (-7.883) (-3.086) (2.650) (-4.419) 
Independence -1.408 0.400 0.034 -1.979*** -11.171 -0.001 
 (-1.606) (0.760) (0.631) (-3.504) (-1.055) (-1.065) 
Independence × Size 0.222* -0.004 -0.003 0.287*** 1.448 0.000 
 (1.909) (-0.049) (-0.390) (3.834) (0.973) (1.468) 
Independence × Findum 4.153* 27.063*** 0.064 5.282*** 136.611*** 0.001 
 (1.899) (6.333) (0.578) (3.288) (3.346) (0.328) 
Findum × Size 0.348 0.357 0.030*** 0.100 5.279* 0.000 
 (1.566) (0.369) (2.757) (0.654) (1.700) (1.409) 
Independence × Findum × Size -0.523** -3.193*** -0.008 -0.687*** -15.743*** -0.000 
  (-2.193) (-6.486) (-0.686) (-3.750) (-3.289) (-0.535) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 20,435 20,704 20,435 21,390 20,801 22,115 
R-squared 0.762 0.514 0.808 0.685 0.795 0.923 
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Table 5. Regulatory changes in board independence at banks 
This table reports regression results examining the impact of the 2003 NYSE/NASDAQ rules requiring firms to 
have at least 50% of their board members to be independent. The sample period includes three years before and after 
the introduction of the new rules from 2000 to 2005. The dependent variables in the 6 columns are DD, -Leverage, -
AVOL, MES, -SRISK and COVAR. DD is Merton’s (1974) distance-to-default measure computed as the difference 
between the asset value of a firm and the face value of its debt scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset 
value. AVOL is asset volatility computed using the Merton (1974) model. Leverage is market leverage computed by 
dividing the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities by the market value of equity. MES 
is marginal expected shortfall computed as the average stock return of a firm when the market return is in the bottom 
5th percentile in a given year. SRISK is expected capital shortfall when the market return is in the lowest 5% bracket 
in a given year. COVAR is conditional value at risk measure computed as the change in the value at risk (VaR) of 
the system when the firm is at the 5th percentile minus the VaR of the system when the institution is at the 50th 
percentile in terms of its stock returns. We multiply Leverage, AVOL and SRISK by -1 so that higher values 
indicate lower risk consistent with the other risk measures. Return on assets is net income divided by total assets.  
Market-to-book is the market to book ratio computed as market capitalization divided by the book value of equity. 
Size is the log of total assets. Post is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for the time period 2003 to 2005 
when the new rules had been introduced. Affected is a dummy variable set to one for firms that were not compliant 
with the new requirements in 2002. The regressions include firm fixed effects.  An included time variable and its 
interaction with the Affected variable are unreported. T-statistics based on errors clustered at the firm level are 
provided in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  DD -Leverage -AVOL MES -SRISK COVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Return on assets 6.376** -9.346 -0.157* -0.015 6.939 -0.022* 
 (2.370) (-0.683) (-1.698) (-0.979) (1.272) (-1.747) 
Market-to-book -0.152*** -0.163 -0.010*** -0.002*** 0.161 -0.000* 
 (-3.022) (-0.564) (-4.725) (-4.631) (0.944) (-1.802) 
Size -0.917*** -1.815** 0.037*** -0.005*** -0.683 -0.002 
 (-2.654) (-2.051) (4.160) (-2.702) (-0.411) (-1.425) 
Post -1.996** 0.197 0.060*** -0.015*** -22.907*** 0.004 
 (-2.372) (0.176) (3.057) (-3.646) (-2.860) (0.914) 
Post × Affected 7.138*** 9.032*** 0.189** 0.030** 29.642*** 0.004 
 (2.989) (3.204) (2.240) (2.477) (2.620) (0.481) 
Post × Size 0.311*** 0.024 -0.005*** 0.002*** 2.593*** 0.000 
 (3.904) (0.217) (-2.852) (4.831) (3.008) (0.012) 
Affected × Size 0.046 -0.088 0.009 -0.007* -0.183 -0.000 
 (0.069) (-0.061) (0.202) (-1.733) (-0.093) (-0.054) 
Post × Affected × Size 
 
-0.701*** -0.858*** -0.020** -0.003** -3.222*** -0.001 
 (-2.865) (-3.232) (-2.051) (-2.160) (-2.685) (-0.671) 
Firm FE & Time trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 926 919 926 932 919 921 
R-squared 0.798 0.841 0.934 0.621 0.806 0.485 
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Table 6. Regulatory changes in board independence at banks vs. non-financial firms 
This table reports regression results examining the impact of the 2003 NYSE/NASDAQ rules requiring firms to 
have at least 50% of their board members to be independent (not affiliated with the firm). The sample period 
includes three years before and after the introduction of the new rules from 2000 to 2005. The dependent variables 
in the 6 columns are DD, -Leverage, -AVOL, MES, -SRISK and COVAR. DD is Merton’s (1974) distance-to-
default measure computed as the difference between the asset value of a firm and the face value of its debt scaled by 
the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value. Leverage is market leverage computed by dividing the sum of the 
market value of equity and the book value of liabilities by the market value of equity. AVOL is asset volatility 
computed using the Merton (1974) model. MES is marginal expected shortfall computed as the average stock return 
of a firm when the market return is in the bottom 5th percentile in a given year. SRISK is expected capital shortfall 
when the market return is in the lowest 5% bracket in a given year. COVAR is conditional value at risk measure 
computed as the change in the value at risk (VaR) of the system when the firm is at the 5th percentile minus the VaR 
of the system when the institution is at the 50th percentile in terms of its stock returns. We multiply Leverage, AVOL 
and SRISK by -1 so that higher values indicate lower risk consistent with the other risk measures. Size is the log of 
total assets. Post is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for the time period 2003 to 2005 when the new 
rules had been introduced. Affected is a dummy variable set to one for firms that were not compliant with the new 
requirements in 2002. Findum is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm is a financial firm. Return 
on assets and Market-to-book are unreported. Panel A includes an interaction term of the Post, Affected, Size and 
Findum variables. The uninteracted variables, double and triple interactions, a time variable, and an interaction of 
the time variable with the Affected variable and firm fixed effects are unreported. In Panels B and C, we report 
results from placebo tests in which we assume that the rule introduction took place three years later in Panel B and 
three years earlier in Panel C than the actual rule introduction in 2003.  Accordingly, we set the Post dummy 
variable to one for the period after 2005 in regressions reported in Panel B, and to one for the period after 1999 in 
Panel C. T-statistics based on errors clustered at the firm level are provided in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A: Banks vs. non-financials DD -Leverage -AVOL MES -SRISK COVAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post × Affected × Size × Findum -0.861*** -0.859*** -0.037*** -0.005*** -5.237* -0.002** 
 (-3.220) (-4.412) (-3.021) (-3.864) (-1.791) (-2.556) 
Firm FE & Time trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,334 7,060 7,155 7,185 7,060 7,150 
R-squared 0.852 0.860 0.831 0.511 0.925 0.498 
 
Panel B: Post 2005 placebo 
Post × Affected × Size × Findum 0.503* 1.505 0.017 0.002 12.880** 0.000 
 (1.665) (0.903) (1.237) (0.757) (2.440) (0.360) 
Firm FE & Time trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,193 6,069 6,193 6,240 6,069 6,197 
R-squared 0.766 0.419 0.744 0.602 0.836 0.471 
 
Panel C: Post 1999 placebo     
Post × Affected × Size × Findum -0.061 -0.168 0.002 -0.008 1.722 -0.000 
 (-0.356) (-0.686) (0.938) (-0.635) (0.696) (-0.009) 
Firm FE & Time trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,400 7,341 7,400 7,448 7,341 7,388 
R-squared 0.647 0.842 0.861 0.884 0.877 0.504 
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Table 7. Corporate governance and equity returns of US banks during the financial crisis 
The dependent variable is Return, which is the average monthly stock return during the financial crisis period from 
January to September 2008. Return on assets is net income divided by total assets.  Market-to-book is the market to 
book ratio computed as the market capitalization divided by book equity. Size is the log of total assets. Findum is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm is a financial firm. Governance is an overall governance 
index. Entrenchment is an index of executive entrenchment with higher values indicating better governance. 
Independence is the share of board members not affiliated with the firm. All explanatory variables are for 2007. T-
statistics based on robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  
  Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Return on assets 0.045*** 0.018 0.038** 0.131*** 0.005 0.119 0.042*** 0.012 0.035** 
 (8.990) (1.019) (2.242) (3.224) (0.049) (1.193) (8.298) (0.679) (2.101) 
Market-to-book -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001* 
 (-1.618) (-1.186) (-1.815) (-0.476) (-0.506) (-0.904) (-1.597) (-1.346) (-1.795) 
Size 0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.032*** -0.014* 0.024 0.007 -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.952) (-4.397) (-3.413) (3.563) (-1.879) (1.155) (1.562) (-1.289) (-1.321) 
Findum 0.020 -0.024* 0.055**     -0.195*** 0.087 -0.218 
 (1.142) (-1.823) (2.293)     (-2.582) (1.406) (-1.498) 
Findum × Size         0.025** -0.010 0.030* 
         (2.434) (-1.631) (1.830) 
Governance 0.011    0.363***    0.055   
 (0.850)    (3.605)    (1.369)   
Governance × Size     -0.049***    -0.008   
     (-3.780)    (-1.303)   
Entrenchment   -0.000    0.005    0.004  
  (-0.216)    (0.268)    (0.737)  
Entrenchment × Size      -0.001    -0.001  
      (-0.430)    (-0.823)  
Independence   0.001   0.994**   -0.060 
   (0.061)   (2.112)   (-0.986) 
Independence × Size       -0.117**   0.008 
       (-2.315)   (0.987) 
Governance × Findum -0.032        0.322***   
 (-1.194)        (2.861)   
Entrenchment × Findum  -0.005*        0.001  
  (-1.798)        (0.075)  
Independence × Findum   -0.070**       0.329* 
   (-2.235)       (1.747) 
Governance × Findum × Size         -0.041***   
         (-2.772)   
Entrenchment × Findum × Size          -0.000  
          (-0.152)  
Independence × Findum × Size           -0.044** 
           (-2.085) 
Observations 3,430 1,229 1,090 704 190 150 3,430 1,229 1,090 
R-squared 0.031 0.026 0.024 0.041 0.119 0.083 0.037 0.045 0.031 
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Table 8. Corporate governance and risk at international banks 
The dependent variables in the 6 columns are DD, -Leverage, -AVOL, MES, -SRISK and COVAR. DD is Merton’s 
(1974) distance-to-default measure computed as the difference between the asset value of a firm and the face value 
of its debt scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value. Leverage is market leverage computed by 
dividing the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities by the market value of equity. AVOL 
is asset volatility computed using the Merton (1974) model. MES is marginal expected shortfall computed as the 
average stock return of a firm when the market return is in the bottom 5th percentile in a given year. SRISK is 
expected capital shortfall when the market return is in the lowest 5% bracket in a given year. COVAR is conditional 
value at risk measure computed as the change in the value at risk (VaR) of the system when the firm is at the 5th 
percentile minus the VaR of the system when the institution is at the 50th percentile in terms of its stock returns. We 
multiply Leverage, AVOL and SRISK by -1 so that higher values indicate lower risk consistent with the other risk 
measures. Market-to-book is the market to book ratio computed as market capitalization divided by the book value 
of equity. Size is the log of total assets. Inflation is the percentage annual change in the consumer price index. GDP 
growth is the real rate of GDP growth. GDP per capita is the GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. Activity restriction is an index of regulatory restrictions on bank activities is an index of regulatory 
oversight of financial institutions with higher values indicating greater stringency. Supervisory power is an index of 
the power of bank supervisory authorities to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems with higher values 
indicating greater supervisory power. Diversification is an index of diversification guidelines imposed on banks with 
higher values indicating greater diversification. Financial freedom is an index of government regulations and 
controls on the financial sector with higher values indicating greater freedom. Governance is an overall governance 
index. Financial safety net is an index based on 8 deposit insurance design features with higher values indicating a 
more generous safety net.  In Panel B, we instrument for the Governance variable using the average Governance 
measure for non-financial firms in a given country and year named Governance non-financials. We instrument for 
the interaction of Governance and Financial safety net using the interaction of average Governance of non-financial 
firms in a given country and year with Financial safety net, i.e. Governance non-financials x Financial safety net.  
The first stage regression results are reported in columns 1 and 2. Regressions in Panel B include unreported control 
variables. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. T-statistics based on errors clustered at the firm level 
are provided in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Panel A: Financial safety net interaction 
  DD -Leverage -AVOL MES -SRISK COVAR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Return on assets 2.615*** 6.772* -0.037 -0.004 -1.304 0.001 
 (2.706) (1.759) (-0.592) (-0.319) (-0.550) (0.257) 
Market-to-book -0.105** 0.612*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.082 -0.000 
 (-2.051) (3.994) (-3.436) (-1.357) (-0.787) (-0.879) 
Size -0.587*** -1.401* 0.030*** -0.009*** -1.775** -0.003*** 
 (-2.842) (-1.850) (3.148) (-4.433) (-2.382) (-2.897) 
Inflation 90.934*** -126.745 0.804 0.732* 448.546 -0.432* 
 (2.835) (-1.112) (1.242) (1.734) (1.080) (-1.933) 
GDP growth 33.289*** 135.947*** 0.587*** 0.449*** -62.029 0.086 
 (2.884) (3.091) (2.594) (3.935) (-0.731) (0.972) 
GDP per capita -0.546** -2.957** 0.007 -0.012*** -2.713** -0.006*** 
 (-2.576) (-2.280) (1.313) (-4.414) (-2.411) (-3.474) 
Activity restriction -0.995*** 0.161 -0.001 -0.005 -0.308 -0.005** 
 (-2.753) (0.166) (-0.078) (-1.464) (-0.094) (-2.467) 
Capital stringency 0.419 0.020 0.006 0.002 -0.019 0.001 
 (1.606) (0.033) (1.279) (1.000) (-0.015) (0.845) 
Supervisory power -0.279 1.112* -0.004 -0.002* 0.480 0.003** 
 (-1.552) (1.768) (-1.235) (-1.934) (0.551) (1.986) 
Diversification -0.567** -2.056** 0.004 -0.005 2.000 -0.006*** 
 (-2.268) (-2.069) (0.587) (-1.071) (0.441) (-3.447) 
Financial freedom 0.009 -0.006 0.001*** -0.000** -0.163* 0.000 
 (1.068) (-0.200) (4.365) (-2.061) (-1.811) (0.429) 
Governance 0.270 6.772 -0.032 0.009 -0.426 0.002 
 (0.166) (1.272) (-0.925) (0.641) (-0.075) (0.200) 
Governance × Financial safety net -0.586* -0.998 -0.016** -0.012*** -1.365 -0.002 
 (-1.756) (-0.893) (-2.053) (-4.089) (-1.203) (-0.961) 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3924 3888 3924 3927 3886 3747 
R-squared 0.644 0.397 0.256 0.580 0.053 0.358 
Panel B: Financial safety net interaction – IV regression 
 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
 
Governance Governance x 
Financial 
safety net 
DD -Leverage -AVOL MES -SRISK COVA
R 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Governance non-financials 0.955*** -0.024       
 (7.189) (-0.059)       
Governance non-financials ×  
Financial safety net 
0.027 0.927***       
(0.987) (8.902)       
Instrumented Governance   -2.549 30.843* -0.202* -0.035 13.239 0.019 
   (-0.453) (1.701) (-1.704) (-0.945) (0.576) (0.567) 
Instrumented Governance ×  
Financial safety net 
  
-
3.664*** -11.014*** 
-
0.062*** 
-
0.047*** -4.993 -0.000 
    (-5.180) (-3.109) (-3.671) (-6.293) (-1.509) (-0.020) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,937 3,937 3,790 3,748 3,790 3,785 3745 3,617 
R-squared 0.307 0.268 0.547 0.419 0.169 0.461 0.052 0.348 
